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D URING the period under review no landmark rulings on evidence
were handed down by the Texas appellate courts. A few decisions of
more than ordinary interest have been selected for comment here.
I. HEARSAY
Former Testimony. Perhaps the most significant decision of the year
came from the Dallas court of civil appeals.' In a case of first impression
in Texas the court ruled that testimony given by a witness in a prior crim-
inal trial was admissible in a subsequent civil case where the party against
whom it was offered had full opportunity to cross-examine the witness
(now dead) in the prior case on the same issue.'
The plaintiff was the owner of a restaurant which was destroyed by
fire. He was tried and acquitted on a charge of arson. At that trial a wit-
ness testified to the effect that the plaintiff told him of his intention to set
fire to the restaurant in order to collect the insurance on the building and
contents, showed the witness how he planned to set the fire and offered the
witness money to set it. The civil suit was against insurance com-
panies for the fire loss. Their defense was that plaintiff burned the prop-
erty or caused it to be done. Plaintiff (Bryant) argued that the testimony
was not admissible since the issues in the two trials were different, i.e.,
the issue in the criminal trial was Bryant's guilt while that in the civil
case concerned property rights. The court ruled that the real issue in
both actions was whether Bryant had set the fire or had procured the
burning of the building and that he had adequate opportunity to cross-
examine the witness on this issue.
The older statement of the former testimony exception to the hearsay
rule requires that the parties and issues in the two trials be the same and
that the witness be unavailable at the present trial. A minority of courts
which adhere strictly to the requirement of identity of parties would ex-
clude the evidence in the present case. The majority of courts which have
considered the question adopt the more liberal view followed by the
Dallas court, i.e., the test is whether the party against whom the evidence
is now offered was a party in the criminal trial and had full opportunity
to cross-examine the witness at that time.'
Business Records. One of the requirements for admission under the Bus-
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iness Records Act' is a showing that some employee or representative of
the business who made the entry or transmitted information to another
to be recorded had personal knowledge of the act, event or condition. A
court of civil appeals applied this requirement to uphold the exclusion of
entries on the bottom half of a bank account card.' The card was offered
to prove that the defendants were engaged in a joint venture. The top part
of the card showed "Postscript Homes" as the name of the account fol-
lowed by signatures of the defendants. On the bottom half, the wordt
"construction" appeared as the type of business, followed by the words
"new joint venture." In the lower right-hand corner under the heading
"Teller" were the initials "N.Y." A bank officer testified that the card
was made in the regular course of the bank's business, that filling in of
the longhand writing was done at or about the time the account was
opened, and that it was customary for the teller or whoever filled out
that part of the card to put his initials at the bottom of the card. But the
officer stated that he had no knowledge of who the person was or whether
that person had personal knowledge of the information contained in the
entry. In upholding the trial court reliance was placed upon the supreme
court's ruling in Siillern & Sons, Inc. v. Rosen' to the effect that there
must be a showing that the person who made the entry or who transmit-
ted the information for the entry had personal knowledge of the matter.
Admissions. Where a defendant in a criminal case pleads guilty to negli-
gent acts charged against him, his plea is admissible in a civil suit to
recover damages resulting from such alleged negligent acts.! In a recent
civil appeals case' plaintiff claimed the trial court erred in excluding testi-
mony of a clerk of corporation court to the effect that a plea of guilty
had been entered to the charge of negligent collision. The evidence indi-
cated that defendant's wife paid a $25 fine, and that no plea of guilty was
made by defendant or his counsel. The appellate court said that prior
to 1965, and at the time the accident occurred, payment of a fine did not
constitute a plea of guilty in open court as though a plea of nolo conten-
dere had been entered by defendant as it now does;9 and that the trial
court did not err in excluding testimony concerning payment by the wife
of the fine.
Confessions. In Hearn v. State'" the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held
that the failure of an arresting officer to take one, charged with driving
while intoxicated, immediately before a magistrate did not render inad-
missible evidence pertaining to a blood test for alcohol to which the ac-
cused consented; and that the question of whether consent was voluntary
'TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (1965).
'North Tex. Lumber Co. v. Kaspar, 415 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
6359 S.W.2d 298, 305 (Tex. 1962).
"Canales v. Bank of California, 316 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref.
'Barrios v. Davis, 415 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
"See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.14 (1965).
0411 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
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was properly left to the jury. The court said the Confession Statute' has
no application to the obtaining of consent for taking blood specimens for
analysis; and that the principles announced by the United States Supreme
Court in Escobedo v. Illinois" and Massiah v. United States3 relating to
confessions and incriminating statements made by an accused are not
controlling as to the giving of blood specimens. The court also mentioned
that it had previously held in Weeks v. State" that a consent to search
was not a confession and not governed by the rules announced by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda v. Arizona."
One of the grounds relied upon by the court of criminal appeals for
reversal of the conviction in the celebrated Ruby 6 case was the erroneous
admission into evidence of the alleged statement by Ruby some minutes
after his arrest and while in a jail cell being interrogated by police officers.
The alleged statement was to the effect that Ruby had seen Oswald in a
police lineup two nights before and that when he saw the sarcastic sneer
on Oswald's face he had decided that if he ever got the chance he would
kill him. Prior to answering questions preceding the alleged statement
Ruby had asked if any of his answers would be made available to maga-
zines or publications. When assured that he was being questioned only for
police purposes he replied that he would "be glad to answer questions."
The court held that the statement constituted an oral confession of pre-
meditation made while in police custody and its admission was in violation
of the Confession Statute. The court further ruled that it did not qualify
as a spontaneous utterance in view of the deliberate caution with which
accused spoke.
II. WITNESSES
Competency-Husband and Wife. In Ex parte Moreland7 the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals ruled that a wife who did not voluntarily testify or
swear to a complaint against her husband, who was charged with statutory
rape on her daughter, could not be compelled to testify against him. The
question arose in a habeas corpus proceeding to discharge her from con-
finement under an order adjudging her in contempt for refusing to an-
swer a question propounded to her as a witness before the grand jury.
The court based its ruling upon article 38.11 of the new Code of Crim-
inal Procedure, adopted in 1965." Prior to that time article 714 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1925, had provided that the husband and wife
should "in no case testify against each other except in a criminal prosecu-
tion for an offense committed by one against the other."" This provision
1 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (1965).
1"378 U.S. 478 (1964).
13 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
14417 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). The court in Hearn was citing the original un-
published opinions in Weeks.
15384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16 Rubenstein v. State, 407 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
17415 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
"TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (1965).
19Former art. 714, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. (1925) (emphasis added).
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had been construed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to mean that
the state could call the wife and compel her to testify where he was
charged with an offense against her.2" Furthermore, article 605 of the
Penal Code provides that in prosecutions relating to wife and child deser-
tion "both husband and wife shall be competent and compellable wit-
nesses to testify against each other as to any relevant matter .. . ."" In
contrast with these statutes article 38.11 of the new Code says, "However,
a wife or husband may voluntarily testify against each other in any case
for an offense involving any grade of assault or violence committed by
one against the other or against the child of either under 16 years of age
or in any case where either is charged with an offense . . . pertaining to
wife or child desertion or failure or refusal to support his or her minor
children."2 The Court emphasized the use of the words "may voluntarily
testify against the other." It said the legislature had the authority to
change the rule relating to whether a competent witness could be com-
pelled to testify and had done so. It agreed that if a wife did voluntarily
become a witness against her husband or swear to a complaint against him
then she could be compelled to testify as any other witness. But in this
case the petitioner did not voluntarily testify or swear to such a com-
plaint and the contempt order was, therefore, erroneous.
Dead Man's Statute. Article 3716 of the Revised Civil Statutes, 1925, was
held to require the exclusion of testimony by a widow concerning state-
ments made by her deceased husband, previously a member of a partner-
ship, expressing dissatisfaction with the business relationship with surviv-
ing partner and a desire to rewrite the partnership agreement.' The widow
of the deceased partner had sued the surviving partner seeking a declara-
tion that the partnership agreement terminated at the end of the initial
ten-year period. The surviving partner had filed a cross-action against the
widow in her individual capacity and as executor of the deceased partner
for cancellation of a deed executed by the deceased partner to the widow
of a one-fourth interest in the partnership assets and for an accounting.
Since the cross-action was against the widow in her representative capacity
as well as individually and since she answered in both capacities, the statute
undoubtedly applied to the action and the widow was certainly an inter-
ested party. Her disqualification necessarily followed.
In Roberts v. Roberts' the Texas Supreme Court refused writ of error,
thereby approving the court of civil appeals ruling' to the effect that the
Dead Man's Statute did not prevent the heirs of a decedent from testify-
ing that after his death they saw and read a holographic will (produced
in court), and that it was in the handwriting of the deceased, nor did it
prohibit testimony by them as to the contents of the instrument.
2
°Bramblette v. State, 21 Tex. Crim. App. 611, 2 S.W. 765 (1886).
21TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 605 (1967).
22 TEx. CODE CRiM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.11 (1965) (emphasis added).
23Southworth v. Clark, 411 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
24407 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. 1966), discussed in 21 Sw. L.J. 173 (1967).
25405 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). The civil appeals opinion was previously discussed




A salutary application of the doctrine of judicial notice to geographical
facts was made by the Texas Supreme Court in Barber v. Intercoast
Jobbers & Brokers.26 Plaintiff filed suit in Ector County against defendant
for death of his wife in a collision between defendant's truck and the car
his wife was driving. He produced evidence showing that the accident
occurred at the intersection of 81st Street and Highway 385 four miles
north of downtown Odessa. The trial court overruled defendant's plea of
privilege but the court of civil appeals reversed the trial court's action
and ordered the cause transferred to Dawson County, holding that there
was no proof that the accident occurred in Ector County and that the
trial court could not judicially know that a point about four miles north
of Odessa was in Ector County. The supreme court reversed the court of
civil appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. It stated that
the fact was one which was certain and indisputable and capable of "ver-
ifiable certainty."27 It pointed to numerous supreme court and civil ap-
peals precedents noticing such facts as: that Amarillo is not situated
wholly within Potter County; that an entire city is located in a particular
county; that the western boundary of Nueces County is several miles
west of Robstown; that a collision point located one-eighth of a mile
south of the city limits of Rockdale was in Milam County; that an acci-
dent point two miles east of Katy was in Harris County; that a point six
miles from McKinney was in Collin County. The Court said these deci-
sions reflect the present status of judicial knowledge concerning geograph-
ical facts about the location of places in counties. It distinguished Miller
v. Burke,8 relied upon by the court of civil appeals, pointing out that
plaintiff there failed to prove the location of the accident with reference
either to a county or any other place. He had merely alleged that the acci-
dent occurred in Harris County but offered no evidence concerning the
place where it occurred.
In Schecter v. Folsom" the Dallas court of civil appeals held that a
court may not take judicial notice of the reasonableness of an attorney's
fee. A landlord had brought an action against his tenant for rent alleged
to be due plus attorney's fees under the written terms of a lease contract.
In a case tried by the judge, plaintiff received judgment for $540 for
rentals and $350 for attorney's fees. At the trial no evidence was offered
to show that the $350 was a reasonable fee. The court severed the part
of the judgment for attorney's fees and reversed as to it, relying upon
Great American Reserve Insurance Co. v. Britton,"° where the supreme
court, in a case involving article 3.62 of the Texas Insurance Code, held
26417 S.W.2d 154 (1967), noted in 21 Sw. L.J. 707 (1967). For further discussion, see
VanDercreek, Texas Civil Procedure, this Survey, at footnote 66.
2
'The court relied upon C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 211 (2d
ed. 1956).
28401 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
29417 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
30406 S.W.2d 901, 907 (Tex. 1966).
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that a court did not have the authority to adjudicate the reasonableness of
an attorney's fee on the basis of the judicial notice.
IV. LEGISLATION
Privilege for Communications Made to Clergymen. The common law rec-
ognized no privilege protecting from disclosure confidential communica-
tions made to clergymen, ministers or priests in their professional capacity. 3'
Over the years, however, some three-fourths of the states in the United
States have enacted statutes sanctioning such a privilege. Prior to 1967,
Texas had no such statute and the privilege had never received judicial ap-
proval from the appellate courts. This was changed by the Sixtieth Legis-
lature in 1967 by the enactment of the following statute which became
effective on August 28, 1967:
No ordained minister, priest, rabbi or duly accredited Christian Science
practitioner of an established church or religious organization shall be re-
quired to testify in any action, suit or proceeding, concerning any informa-
tion which may have been confidentially communicated to him in his pro-
fessional capacity under such circumstances that to disclose the information
would violate a sacred or moral trust, when the giving of such testimony is
objected to by the communicant; provided, however, that the presiding judge
in any trial may compel such disclosure if in his opinion the same is necessary
to a proper administration of justice."3
It should be noted that the wording of the statute differs substantially
from that of rule 29 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence which was taken
from rule 219 of the Model Code of Evidence. That rule provides that
the penitent may refuse to disclose or prevent the clergyman from disclos-
ing a penitential communication; that the claim of privilege may be
made by the penitent or by the clergyman on behalf of an absent penitent.
The Texas statute merely says that the priest or clergyman shall not dis-
close if the communicant objects. However, since the penitent is really
the proprietor of the privilege it is reasonable to assume that where the
communicant is the witness he would be allowed to assert the privilege
and refuse to disclose the communication.
The Texas statute is more restrictive than those in most states since the
judge is given authority to compel disclosure if in his discretion disclosure
is necessary to the proper administration of justice. This limitation has
been recommended by many commentators since the absolute privilege
when granted often does prevent the triers from receiving information
essential to a rational and just decision.
It is interesting to note that Jeremy Bentham, the great reformer and
in general an opponent of all privileges because they suppress relevant
and vital evidence, sought to justify the penitent-priest privilege. Wig-
more also advanced arguments in support of it.
While the legislature has now officially created the privilege it is doubt-
"' C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 492 (2d ed. 1956).
"TEx. REv. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 3715a (Supp. 1967) (emphasis added).
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ful that the outcome of any trial is likely to be influenced by the statute.
It is believed that a de facto privilege has existed in the absence of statute.
I know of several instances where the minister stood his ground and re-
fused to obey the judge's admonition to answer, without suffering any
penalty. No case has been found where a priest or clergyman was com-
pelled to disclose communications made in the confessional. It is difficult
to imagine an elected judge committing a clergyman for contempt in
refusing to obey an instruction to disclose a confession made to him.
